ALPA’s National Security Committee (NSC) and Air Safety Committee want to remind all flight and cabin crewmembers of the need for disciplined vigilance when the cockpit door must be opened.

The hijacking of a Turkish airliner on October 3 was not widely reported, but it highlighted the continuing need for secondary barriers to the cockpit—and good crew resource management (CRM)—to prevent unauthorized access to airliner cockpits.

The hijacking involved Turkish Airlines Flight 1476, B-737 service from Tirana, Albania, to Istanbul, Turkey with 113 persons aboard. A single passenger hijacked the flight in Greek airspace at 1458 UTC. Italian F-16s later forced the flight to land at Brindisi, Italy.

The captain of the flight reported in Istanbul that “while the chief [flight attendant] entered the cockpit to ask if we needed anything, the terrorist entered by force. I tried to push him out, but he was a big man, and I failed to stop him.”

Says Capt. Bob Hesselbein (Northwest), NSC chairman, “Although this incident was resolved without fatalities, the assault and seizure serve as dramatic evidence that having a fortified cockpit door does not guarantee protection. Of equal concern, this successful hijacking provides a plan for other attackers to employ.”

Several U.S. airlines are actively designing or deploying secondary barriers on the cabin side of the fortified cockpit door. A secondary barrier is needed on all airliners, to the extent practicable, to provide a safeguard against unlawful entry into the cockpit whenever the cockpit door is opened. Although most airlines have instituted procedures for blocking access to the cockpit door when it is opened, ALPA receives reports on an ongoing basis that these procedures are either inadequate or not followed closely enough to provide sufficient protection against forced entry.

For these reasons, ALPA’s NSC and Air Safety Committee are currently developing Association-endorsed standards for the design and deployment of secondary barriers. ALPA will press for installation of such barriers in the coming year.

Until secondary cockpit barriers are installed, ALPA recommends that you do the following:

• Review your airline’s current cockpit door security procedures to determine whether they include all of the following elements:
  -- using visual recognition cockpit access procedures;
  -- using disciplined “cockpit door open” time limits;
  -- having a galley cart placed in front of the cockpit door before opening (to add a protective buffer that can significantly delay or deter an assault on the flight deck and reveal an attacker’s hostile intent); and
  -- replacing an absent flightcrew member on the flight deck with a flight attendant until the flightcrew member returns;
   
• If you believe that your airline’s cockpit door security procedures are inadequate, inform your MEC Security Chairman/Coordinator for follow-up with management as appropriate.
   
• Closely follow established cockpit door security procedures and encourage fellow crewmembers to do likewise. The captain’s brief should include a reminder of these procedures.
   
• Plan to add your support for your airline's installing secondary barriers after ALPA completes development of standards and guidance for them in early 2007.

Pilots who have questions or comments about this or any other aviation safety or security issue should contact the ALPA Engineering and Air Safety Department at 1-800-424-2470 or at EAS@alpa.org.